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Abstract: 
Top executive compensation has always been a subject of debate. In this paper, we try to 
comprehend effects of economic cycles on top executives’ compensation in relation with implicit 
contracts. We use in our model various variables used in both studies in order to assess the 
impacts of each on compensation components for NYSE listed companies. We also include three 
macroeconomic variables related to unemployment rate in order to explore if there are any 
macroeconomic effects on a top executive’s compensation. Beaudry and DiNardo (BD) use 
unemployment levels to interpret economic variations impacts on compensation, their framework 
refers to salary workers receiving a fixed annual wage only. We try to apply an adjusted model 
using their variables since a top executive compensation includes a fixed component similar to 
salary workers. By testing the model in a disaggregated way; on each component separately; we 
will attempt to find a link between economic cycles and their compensation. Economic cycles 
are determinants of wage determination but results are different when evaluating each 
component separately. 
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1. Introduction 
Top executive compensation has always been a subject of debate. In the business 
community for example, CEO’s compensation has been criticized to be over-rewarding. While in 
the academic community, determinants of top executive compensation have always been debated 
between researchers. On the other hand, understanding and measuring effects of business cycles 
on wages has been treated in many recent studies: In fact, implicit contracts theory explores the 
existing dynamic between contracts and remuneration. As for Beaudry and DiNardo (BD), they 
capture the role of current and anterior economic conditions in determining real wages. 
Nevertheless, these studies treat one type of compensation that is based on an annual wage 
excluding other types of compensation such as top executives’.  
In this paper, we try to comprehend effects of economic cycles on top executives’ 
compensation in relation with implicit contracts. We would like to analyse economic effects 
since their date of entry at the company and examine effects of current and anterior economic 
conditions vis-à-vis their remuneration. It is important to ask such a question because it focuses 
on a different type of compensation that hasn’t been taken into account in implicit contract 
theory. In reality, top executives are compensated a fixed salary on an annual basis but their 
contracts include also options such as in-the-money, stock holdings, bonuses and pension plans. 
These forms of compensation are directly linked to the performance of the executive himself but 
also to the company’s. Therefore, it becomes interesting to analyse contemporaneous and 
anterior economic cycle impacts on this alternative type of compensation. Our main contribution 
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is then our attempt to explore the relationship between macroeconomic determinants and 
microeconomic determinants present in top management’s level of remuneration.  
The remainder of this paper is structured into five sections: In the second section, we start 
by reviewing prior empirical literature on determinants of top executive compensation, CEO’s 
and firm performance. In Section 3, we define our econometric model and variables used. 
Furthermore in this section we present and describe our data. Then, in Section 4, we elaborate on 
the methodology used to treat our model. We document the association between level of 
compensation and our predictors. We interpret our conducted empirical results. And in our final 
section, we present a conclusion summarizing our findings.  
2. Literature review  
The literature on top executive compensation examines the main drivers of CEO’s 
compensation: equity holdings, option holding, ownership and corporate governance. Various 
studies show that corporate governance plays an important role in motivating executives to 
increase firm’s performance. Other authors such as Crystal (1991) and Jensen (1993) 
demonstrate that board of directors are ineffective since most of the time CEO and the board 
chair are the same person, and outside directors who usually determine CEO compensation levels 
are hired by CEO himself. In this situation, a board of directors becomes ineffective towards 
setting an optimal pay-for-performance contract. The relation between compensation and options 
holdings has been examined in many articles. Conyon, Peck, Read and Sadler (2000) examine 
options and stock holding contracts of CEOs. They also evaluate the variation of a stock 
portfolio according to the company’s performance and the variation of performance depending 
on the structure of options contract. Nohel and Todd (2003) study how compensation of career 
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oriented CEOs affects their investment strategies. Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) focus on 
identifying determinants of compensation as they study the relationship between excess of 
remuneration and the subsequent company’s performance. They find that economic attributes are 
significant drivers of CEO’s compensation in Australia, that a positive pay-for-performance link 
is present for all components of compensation except for shares in a cross-sectional setting. They 
also observe that after controlling economic attributes; ownership and governance attributes play 
a significant role in the determination of CEO compensation. Hayes and Schaeffer (2000) 
analyse information that is present in top executives’ salaries according to current and past 
economic conditions. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), show that past labor conditions have 
persistent effects on wages. And finally, Bellou and Kaymak (2010) examine impacts of 
economic cycle on wages in Europe and the effects of the nature of negotiation on determining 
salaries. They find that anterior labor conditions play a significant role in predicting current 
wages. They also find that contemporaneous unemployment rate has a significant impact on 
wages which doesn’t allow them to rule out spot market model entirely. And based on the 
structure of labor market in the presence of unions and bargaining practices, their findings show 
that wage behavior is thus different in this situation. It is important to note that these studies do 
not treat CEO compensation but instead regular salaried employees.  
These articles are important for us to understand different relationships between 
compensation and business cycles in general, econometric models used by researchers, top 
executives’ remuneration and performance in particular. We rely on previous results regarding 
main drivers of compensation and apropos implicit contract theory to finally combine them in 
order to examine the dynamics in top executive compensation. 
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3. Econometric Model:  
 Based on Core et al, Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon and Bellou and Kaymak articles 
briefly described in our introduction, we study this econometric model: 
Ln SALTOTi(s, s+t): α1 + β1AGEi+ β2AGEi2+ β3AGEi3+ β4TENi+ β5TENi2+ β6TENi3 + β7ROEs+t 
+ β8ROAs+t + β9RiskRETs+t+ β10RiskCORP+ β11OWN +β12Uct+ β13U0,s+t + β14Uminct; s+t + f+∑i,s λ 
i,s IND +Ѵ i,s TREND+ Ѵ i,s TRENDsq ԑi s+t  
(s: date of entry; s+t: tenure) 
a) Dependent variable: 
Our dependent variable here is SALTOT, composed of a fixed component, stocks awards, option 
awards and bonuses. We suppose each component is affected differently by company’s returns, 
its risks and economic cycles. Therefore, we try to run this model on each component and on the 
totality of this variable (SALTOT) to observe the relationship between the dependent variable 
and predictors. We disaggregate this variable into different categories: fixed salary, cash salary 
and other compensation. Fixed salary will be defined as SALFIX and is only determined by 
noncontingent wage that is fixed at the beginning of the year. Cash salary will be labeled as 
SALCASH and is the sum of salary and annual bonus. Other compensation is in fact valuation of 
options (OPTA) and stocks awarded (STOCKA) as reported in order to have a standard valuation 
across our model. All compensation forms have been deflated to express them all in terms of 
2010 American dollars.  
b) Predictors:  
Our main predictors are ROE, ROA, risk, OWN, U0, Uct, and Umin, COYEAR, TREND and f.  
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We present below a table that defines our variables used in this study and outlines the measure 
methodology of each of our used predictors.  
Table 1: Variable description and measurement 
Variable Label Measure 
CEO compensation 
Fixed salary SALFIX Base wage +pensions+ other benefits 
Bonus BON Annual bonus 
Options OPTA Options awarded as reported by the company 
Stocks STOCKA Stocks awarded as reported by the company 
Cash salary SALCASH SALFIX+BON 
Total salary SALTOT SALFIX+BON+STOCKA+OPTA 
Economic determinants 
Microeconomic : Firm 
Firm’s performance- 
equity returns 
ROE Annual return of equity in capital  
Firm’s performance- 
Stock returns 
ROA Annual return of stocks : EBIT/Total assets 
Firm’s risk RiskRET Standard deviation of ROE for prior 10 years 
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Firm’s risk RiskCORP Standard deviation of ROA for prior 10 years 
Ownership OWN Percentage of shares owned by a top executive 
Macroeconomic : Country 
Contemporaneous 
unemployment rate 
Uct Level of contemporaneous unemployment rate 
Unemployment rate on 
the date of entry 
U0 Level of unemployment rate on the date of entry 
Minimal unemployment 
rate 
Umin ict Value of minimal rate over the studied period 
Control 
age AGE Polynomial : age of CEO (AGE, AGE2) 
tenure TEN Polynomial :years of tenure (TEN, TEN2, TEN3) 
Industry COYEAR Indication variable: companies names  
Year TREND, 
TRENDSQ 
Indication variable : 2002-2012 
Individual fixed effects f Fixed individual effects in the equation that captures all 
unobserved time-constant factors that affect our dependent 
variable 
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c) Sample 
The sample consists of 14 783 compensation related observations; performance related 
observations, contemporaneous unemployment observations and past unemployment related 
observations. We obtained our data using three databases. Microeconomic data has been 
retrieved from Compustat; a data base specialized in finance and top executive compensation. It 
is accessible via Wharton Research data services by University of Wharton in Pennsylvania and 
it provides detailed information on top executives’ annual salaries, bonuses and other forms of 
granted compensation throughout the year. As for the market performance variables (ROE, 
ROA, risk), we used CorporateFocus (infinancials) a database specialised in financial 
information and reporting. And at last, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistics base of United 
States government for yearly unemployment data. We evaluate in our sample remuneration of a 
group of 1041 firms between 2002 and 2012. Selected firms are NYSE index listed companies 
such as IBM, Apple, and AT&T. Performance variables are associated to each company and 
merged with unemployment rates year by year.  
 
a. Preliminary results and analysis 
Table 2 provides detailed descriptive statistics for top executive compensation components and 
correlation between attributes. Top executives are 53 years old, and spend up to 17 years in the 
same firm on average. The mean (median) total executive compensation in our sample is $3 676 
173 ($6 109 874). The mean (median) of compensation contract is composed of a fixed 
component of $3 360 207 ($6 109 874) a bonus of $156 379, and $288 779.6 in options awarded. 
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Average performance measures are positive with an ROA of 4.03% on average and ROE of 
4.54% with standard deviation on assets of 21.9% and an average standard deviation on equity of 
4.4%. Contemporaneous unemployment is 6.7% on average, minimum unemployment is 4.26% 
and unemployment at year of hire is 4.5% on average.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for top executive compensation and suggested attributes 
Panel A: Executive specific attributes 
 Mean Median Std Dev. Min  Max 
Age  53.104 53.108 7.31 29 94 
Tenure (years) 17.11 17.12 4.79 3 68 
We also examine the distribution of executives by gender, we find that only 5.17% are identified 
as female and 94.83% of top executives are male.  
Panel B: Top executive compensation 
 Mean Median Std Dev. Min  Max 
Salary ($00) 33602.07 61098.74 33690.3 0 550962 
Bonus ($00) 156.379  941.404 -479.27.0 2836805 
Stock granted value as reported ($00) 1000.596 402.541 2006.48 -2175.89 73496.34 
Options granted value as reported ($00) 288779.6 1220.492 4657155 0 2.42e+08 
Shares granted  71.17 10.48 1040.36 0 61144 
Cash Compensation ($00) 53011.17 37136.3 95051 0 3197852 
Shares-Ownership (%) 1.02 0.78 4.09 0 100 
Total compensation ($00) 367617.3  7035.79 -164250 19 
10000.07 
All compensation components have been deflated using 2010 CPI.  
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Panel C: Microeconomic determinants  
 Mean Median Std Dev. Min  Max 
Return on assets (%) 0.040 0.040 0.399 -47.3 1.34 
Return on equity (%) 0.045 0.045 3.19 -371.3 43.145 
Standard deviation of ROA 0.044 0.019 0.393 0 19.34 
Standard deviation of ROE 0.21 0.050 3.15 - 151.24 
Standard deviation of ROA and ROE represents respectively the standard deviations of annual 
percentage corporate and stock market return for the prior ten years.  
Panel D: Macroeconomic determinants 
Results in  Mean Median Std  Dev. Min  Max 
Unemployment at year of hire (%) 0.055 0.056 0.005 0.035 0.097 
Contemporaneous unemployment %) 0.067 0.058 0.0187 0.046 0.0963 
Minimum unemployment since year of hire (%) 0.04 0.042 0.002 0.029 0.0808 
 
On the other hand, we examine existing links between our predictors using a correlation matrix. 
It allows us to understand the dynamic relationship between attributes themselves and evaluate if 
in case of very strong correlation, the usefulness of an interactive variable. We present in 
attached annex two matrices, a classic correlation matrix and a combined matrix of two 
correlation coefficients: Pearson and Spearman’s. We examine correlations while using Pearson 
correlation coefficient. We find that firm’s risk is positively correlated with contemporaneous 
unemployment. In other words, the higher is the unemployment rate during a studied year, the 
riskier is to invest in firm stocks. We find a positive relationship between ownership and 
unemployment level at year of hire, which rules out the possibility that economic conditions at 
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year of hire play a role on the shares that a top executive will accumulate throughout the years. 
On the contrary, we find a negative relationship between contemporaneous unemployment level 
and ownership as high as -0.185, which can indicate that the spot conditions would possibly have 
a certain impact on the level of ownership a top executive will be granted. Furthermore, we 
observe that there is a very negative correlation between tenure and minimum unemployment 
with a coefficient of -0.65, due to the fact that minimum unemployment is computed based on 
tenure itself. Using Spearman’s matrix, we find that only minimum unemployment is negatively 
correlated with both ROA (ρ= -0.015) and positively correlated with a company’s risk (ρ= 0.082, 
ρ=0.079). Contemporaneous unemployment is negatively correlated will all variable except for 
risk, the higher is the rate of current unemployment the higher is the risk of a firm, which 
indicates that the current state of an economy could have an impact on the stability of a 
company’s returns. Unemployment rate at the start of the job is negatively correlated with age, 
ownership (ρ=-0.012) and firm’s risk (ρ= -0.012). But correlation is not very strong as we 
observe each rho. In general, spearman’s coefficients are observed to be higher than Pearson’s in 
our case.  
4. Empirical results  
a) Econometric specification 
According to Core et al. (1999) positive pay performance link is found in the US using market 
performance. The level of total CEO compensation is “cross-sectionally” related to firm size, 
investment opportunities, prior performance, and firm risk. The coefficient on the stock return 
variable (RET) exhibits a positive and significant association with compensation”. Based on 
Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) in an Australian study; firm performance (ROA) is 
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positively significant and is associated with all compensation components except shares. CEO 
compensation and market performance are associated through the bonus component, meaning 
that bonuses are positively associated with market and accounting returns. The risk attribute is 
statistically significant for total compensation due to the positive association with the option 
component. Riskier firms are more inclined to reward top executives with options, while in 
contrast this association is significantly negative with shares. Stock compensation is found to be 
used to mitigate monitoring difficulties associated with managers’ use of private information 
related to investment decisions. They also find that CEO’s option holdings are positively 
significant to the fixed component of the salary and to stock holding. Which means for riskier 
firms talented CEOs’ are offered a larger fixed salary and options awards than a less talented 
executive.  
We use in our model various variables used in both studies in order to assess the impacts of each 
on compensation components for NYSE listed companies. We also include three macroeconomic 
variables related to unemployment rate in order to explore if there are any macroeconomic 
effects on a top executive’s compensation. Beaudry and DiNardo (BD) use unemployment levels 
to interpret economic variations impacts on compensation, their framework refers to salary 
workers receiving a fixed annual wage only. We try to apply an adjusted model using their 
variables since a top executive compensation includes a fixed component similar to salary 
workers. By testing the model in a disaggregated way; on each component separately; we will 
attempt to find a link between economic cycles and their compensation. And supposing that 
usually economic cycles tend to affect companies’ market performance, we expect to find an 
association between our macroeconomic predictors and the market based components of a 
CEO’s compensation. We estimate our model using BD approach. We run our model following 
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the three steps: spot market model (Uct), full-commitment risk-sharing model (U0) and one-sided 
lack of commitment with worker mobility model (Umin). In respect to the spot market model β12 
<0 β13= β14=0; which shows that compensation relies on contemporaneous conditions. In a full-
commitment risk sharing model we can test β13 <0 β12= β14=0. And in the case that wages sends 
information about the best economic conditions that the worker experienced we test β14 <0 β13= 
β12=0. We extend our analysis by testing in Stage 1 only microeconomic determinants as applied 
by Core et al (1999) on disaggregated compensation. In stage 2, we test our model following BD 
method to capture effects of macroeconomic determinants on top executive compensation.  
We also include other control variables in our model: age, tenure, industry classification for the 
company, year (linear time trend) and fixed effects. As cited in Bellou and Kaymak’s article, 
tenure is associated with the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and including a cubic 
polynomial in tenure is necessary in order to account for possible non-linearities in the effects of 
tenure on wages that could be inaccurately absorbed by minimum unemployment rate. Therefore 
we treat tenure as a cubic polynomial in our model. Age is also determined as a cubic polynomial 
to adequately estimate effects of age on remuneration. Company indicators are integrated in the 
model to have a classification by company, which each represent an executive in our sample. 
Individual fixed effects are incorporated for time-invariant productivity characteristics.  
b) Results and analysis 
We start our Stage 1 regression where we only regress our microeconomic predictors on our 
disaggregated dependent variable in order to examine direct association between each attribute 
and compensation.  
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We multiply by 100 to simplify the interpretation of our coefficients. We find that ownership and 
return on equity (ROE) have significant impacts on fixed salary (SALFIX) with a negative 
coefficient of -0.029 and -0.06 respectively. Testing for the cash component of compensation 
(SALCASH) we find that ROE and firm’s risk (riskCORP) have significant impacts on 
SALCASH. Return on equity has a negative impact while a firm’s risk has a positive impact. 
Subsequently, testing for our variable part of compensation: options (OPTA) and stocks 
(STOCKA) awarded. We find that only firm’s risk has a significant positive impact on this form 
of remuneration. In fact, our results concords with previous studies where riskier firms tend to 
compensate top executives through options. In our case, we find that an increase in risk firms, 
increases OPTA by 2.6%. Furthermore, running our model using STOCKA as our independent 
variable, we find that return on equity (ROE) has a significant negative impact on STOCKA, 
firm’s risk and ownership have a significant positive impact on STOCKA. Finally, testing our 
model on the totality of compensation (SALTOT), we find that only ROE and firms risk have 
significant impacts on top executive compensation. Comparing our results with findings of 
Chalmers et al. (2006) and Core et al. (1999), we find that our results are most similar to the ones 
reported by Chalmers et al.  
In our Stage 2 regression, we include macroeconomic determinants in order to evaluate impacts 
of economic cycles on compensation. As cited previously, we use BD method to understand how 
and which attribute plays a significant role in the determination of top executive compensation. 
We then observe how all predictors affect our independent compensation components:  
Tenure is the only significant economic determinant for all top executive compensation 
components. ROE is statistically significant with all components except for options. It is 
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negatively associated with these components, which indicates that when a company relies on its 
capital only to generate profit, compensation is reduced. Firm performance measured by ROA 
isn’t significant in our model, which doesn’t support a pay-for-performance link in compensation 
components such as the one found by Chalmers et al. We find that firm’s risk is statistically 
significant on all components except SALFIX. A positive association between firm’s risk and 
options awarded is consistent with previous international studies stating that riskier firms 
compensate their top executives using various options. Firm’s risk is also positively associated 
with SALCASH where we take into account bonuses that a top executive receives. Explaining 
that riskier firms tend to increase bonuses granted with their risk, a tool used probably to 
motivate executives to increase a company’s performance or to retain them. The risk attribute is 
also statistically significant for total compensation which can be explained by the association 
found with the options form of compensation. Ownership is another variable that is only 
significant for the STOCK component. This implies that the higher number of shares an 
executive owns, the higher is the number of awarded stocks by the end of the year too. As in 
previous studies, results suggest that determinants of top executive compensation are not 
restricted to micro-economic attribute only, as we observe that ownership and tenure have a 
significant impact on compensation.  
On the other hand, using our macroeconomic variables only and our control variables; we find 
that one percent change in the contemporaneous unemployment rate leads to a decrease of 1.12% 
of real fixed wage rate. In fact, compared to Bellou and Kaymak, when evaluating real wage 
changes vis-à-vis contemporaneous unemployment, our result is close to their 1.7% observed 
decrease in real wage rate. When introducing the minimum unemployment rate to the model, we 
find that current economic conditions impact is reduced. The change of real fixed wage rate is of 
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-1.04% while minimum unemployment rate becomes much more significant with a coefficient of 
-15.6%. When we introduce the unemployment rate at year of hire separately, we find that a one 
percent change in this rate leads to an increase of 4% in real fixed wage rate. When running the 
model with our three variables we observe a one percent higher current unemployment rate is 
associated with a 1.01% lower wages. A one percent increase in the minimum unemployment 
rate lead to a reduction of -29% in the current wage. We also find that a one percent increase in 
unemployment rate when the top executive was hired is associated with an increase of 4% of real 
fixed wage. We note that history dependence in this case play a very important role in fixed 
salary determination alone for NYSE listed companies and the effect on minimum 
unemployment rate is significantly very large based on our data.  
Turning to the model using both our microeconomic variables and all macroeconomic variables, 
our results suggest that economic cycles are statistically significant on top executive 
compensation.  We find that contemporaneous unemployment has a significant impact on the 
fixed component of compensation with a negative association. A one percent change in the 
national unemployment rate leads to a 2.6% fall in the real wage rate.   Subsequently, a one 
percent increase in the minimum unemployment rate has a significant impact on real fixed wage 
rate, with a reported coefficient of -40%. We find that the unemployment rate at year of hire is 
positively associated with change of current wage.  
When running our model on SALCASH, we find that unemployment variables behave the same 
way as for SALFIX but with reduced coefficient, of -2.29, 6.81, -38% for contemporaneous 
unemployment rate, unemployment rate at year of hire and minimum unemployment rate 
respectively. Economic conditions play a very important role on market related components of 
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compensation (OPTA, STOCKA). We observe that unemployment has the same association with 
option compensation and stock compensation as with fixed salary and bonuses. But current 
economic conditions have a very high impact on the rate of options and stocks awarded with 
coefficients of -24% and -12.73%. It is natural to think that economic conditions have a high 
impact on a company’s performance and risk, which leads to this negative correlation between 
current unemployment rates and these components of a top executive compensation. We find that 
the minimum unemployment rate has a negative impact on both options and stocks awarded 
while the unemployment rate when the job started has a positive impact on these types of 
compensation.  
Finally, when evaluating our model on the totality of compensation we find that only the 
minimum unemployment rate and unemployment rate at year of hire have a significant impact at 
a five percent significance level. Umin is negatively associated with total compensation and U0 is 
positively associated. At a ten percent significance level, we find that all unemployment 
variables are significant, and that Uct is negatively associated with real total wage rate. We can 
say that current and past labor conditions play a role in determining compensation. However, 
when comparing to previous studies we notice that the unemployment rate at the year of hire 
plays an opposite but significant role in the determination of each and all components of top 
executive compensation. When examining our dependent variable, we observe that U0 is 
positively correlated with tenure, firm’s performance (ROA) and ownership. We try to examine 
the impacts when introducing quadratic tenure and quintuple tenure; we do not find a difference 
in the type of association between our unemployment variables and real compensation 
components rate. We present in table 4 in Annex B a summary of our results on each component. 
The table reports the coefficient from running the model using Beaudry and DiNardo 
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unemployment variables, with t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by 
company representing each one top executive.  
c) Discussion   
We suspect that; top executive compensation while it displays history dependence; the direction 
of the association between wages and unemployment indicators is not entirely consistent with 
what implicit contract theory would predict. We argue below that other economic and non-
economic determinants play an important role in determining a top executive’s compensation.  
We first explore economic attributes that haven’t been captured in our model:  G.L Nagel et al 
(2010) argue that a third of CEO rise in pay is also a factor of labor market demand in the US. 
And other two thirds can be explained by increased job risk, agency issues and social pressure 
(Hamermesh, 1975).  
Regarding non-economic attributes, studies highlight the importance of these drivers in the 
process of determining top executive compensation. Appelbaum at al. (2008) discuss the 
importance of negotiation in setting CEO’s pay level. They set a process of compensation that is 
affected by only contextual factors (CEO power, the going rate, and institutional environment), 
process variables (CEO aspiration, principal reservation). These factors play a very important 
role in setting CEO compensation despite economic factors and that a CEO compensation is a 
product of negotiation that helps meet the chief executive officer’s aspiration and principal 
reservation. O’Reilly (1988) examines CEO compensation process and finds that there are many 
elements that play an important role in determining how much an executive is paid such as peer-
group comparison, he finds also that the fact that feelings of reciprocity by compensation 
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committee plays a role in setting his pay. Although members of this committee are independent 
they are most of the time appointed by the CEO. In fact, O’Reilly found that members who 
haven’t been appointed by the chief executive earn a lower salary (12% less). Finally, he argues 
that social status plays also an important role in determining compensation levels. When 
comparing social statuses between top executives, he found that CEO’s who were of higher 
status than the chairman tend to be better paid and vice-versa. And as cited in our literature 
review section, Crystal (1991) and Jensen (1993) demonstrate that board of directors are 
ineffective since most of the time CEO and the board chair are the same person, and outside 
directors who usually determine CEO compensation levels are hired by CEO himself which 
leads to a certain bias in setting CEO’s pay.  
Other studies suggest that market for a top executive talent has also an impact on how 
compensation is set and what factors affect the process of determining levels of top executive’s 
pay. Cremers and Grinstein examine internal and external market for CEO talent. They observe 
that depending on the type of market, factors having an impact on compensation are different. 
They find that internal market are much less sensitive to industry chocks and industry 
performance while external markets respond to industry chocks and companies’ performance. 
And that forces that determine executive compensation are driven by external markets but also 
inside bargaining. Their results support findings of O’Reilly in terms of political dynamics 
present inside a firm in setting top executives’ pay.  
In addition, Falato and Li (2009) find robust evidence that talented CEO show higher turnover 
rates, earn higher compensation and companies anticipate a higher firm performance. Their 
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results are robust when controlling above mentioned governance mechanisms, CEO 
characteristics and firm specificities.  
5. Conclusion  
Using cross-sectional data on 1041 NYSE listed companies; we study the responsiveness of 
different components of executive compensation to current and past economic conditions. We 
show that the contemporaneous unemployment rate has a significant effect on top executive 
compensation; therefore we cannot exclude the important role that spot market models play in 
determining current top executive compensation. On the other hand, past labor market conditions 
are significant predictors of current top executive remuneration levels. Associations between the 
minimum unemployment rates are consistent with implicit theory but are much larger in our 
case. On the contrary, the unemployment rate at the start date of the job is inversely associated 
with compensation. This is opposite to what standard implicit contract theory would predict. 
We discuss other factors that can be explanatory of this difference in the dynamic of 
economic conditions and compensation determination between fixed salaries and top executive 
compensation. We rely on previous studies that add non-economic attributes to top executive 
compensation. We note that various factors play a role in the process of determining a top 
executive compensation such as the type of market for talent, negotiation and turnover. These 
factors are most of the time less sensitive to economic environment and could explain in part 
why top executive compensation does not strictly accord with implicit contract theory. In fact, it 
would be interesting to generate a model that takes into account all these variables and 
understand how these variables compete together in determining top executive compensation. 
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The challenge would be to proxy these variables since they consist of confidential information, 
otherwise information that is rarely publicly released.  
21 
 
References 
Beaudry P. and DiNardo J., 1991. The Effect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages 
over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data.  
Bellou A. and Kaymak B., 2010. Wages, Implicit Contracts, and the business cycle: Evidence 
from a European Panel. University of Montreal, Canada 
Chalmers K., Koh P. and Stapledon G., 2006.The determinants of CEO compensation: Rent 
extraction or labour demand?  Hong Kong University of Science and Technology  
Core J., Holthausen R., Larcker D., 1998. Corporate governance, chief executive officer 
compensation, and firm performance. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania  
Conyon M., Peck S., Read L. and Sadler G., 2000. The structure of executive compensation 
contracts: UK Evidence. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and City business 
school in London. 
Cremers M. and Grinstein Y. The Market for CEO Talent: Implication for CEO compensation. 
Yale School of Management and Cornell University.   
Devreux P. and Hart R., 2005. The spot market matters : evidence on implicit contratcs from 
Britain. 
Falato A. and Li D., 2009. Inside the CEO market: the role of CEO talent pay and turnover 
decisions. Washington University in St Louis.  
Gaver J., Gaver K. and Austin J., 1993. Additional evidence on bonus plans and income 
management. University of Georgia, Athens.  
Hanlon M., Rajgopal S. and Shevlin T., 2002. Are executive stock options associated with future 
earnings?  University of Michigan business school and University of Washington business 
school  
Hayes R., Schaeffer S., 2000. Implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive 
compensation for future performance.  
22 
 
Nohel T. and Todd S., 2003. Compensation for managers with career concerns: the role of stock 
options in optimal contracts. Loyola University of Chicago  
Nahel G., 2010. The effect of Labor Market Demand on U.S CEO pay since 1980. Mississippi 
State University.  
Yao Y. and Appelbaum S., 2008. CEO compensation as a process and product of negotiation. 
John Molson School of Business, Canada.  
Wade J., O’Reilly, C. Chandratat I. 1990. Golden parachutes: CEO’s and the exercise of social 
influence. Administrative Science Quarlerly 35, 587-603 
 
23 
 
ANNEX A 
Correlation matrix for economic and ownership attributes using classic correlation coefficients 
        umin    -0.1764  -0.1860  -0.1917  -0.6617  -0.5170  -0.4197  -0.0112  -0.0070   0.0043   0.0417  -0.1640   0.1676  -0.0328   1.0000
          u0     0.0068   0.0012  -0.0041   0.3423   0.2259   0.1088  -0.0010   0.0052   0.0003  -0.0150   0.0604  -0.0605   1.0000
         uct    -0.1503  -0.1589  -0.1649  -0.1947  -0.1910  -0.1751   0.0237   0.0141   0.0233   0.0081  -0.2500   1.0000
         OWN     0.2571   0.2869   0.3134   0.2519   0.2664   0.2536  -0.0142  -0.0088  -0.0105  -0.0039   1.0000
    riskcorp     0.0079   0.0068   0.0056  -0.0261  -0.0157  -0.0102  -0.0851  -0.0278   0.0158   1.0000
     riskret    -0.0062  -0.0067  -0.0070  -0.0041  -0.0069  -0.0078  -0.0142  -0.0482   1.0000
         roa     0.0107   0.0084   0.0060   0.0071   0.0060   0.0046   0.2665   1.0000
         roe    -0.0087  -0.0089  -0.0088  -0.0011  -0.0023  -0.0028   1.0000
     tenure3     0.2884   0.3133   0.3333   0.8492   0.9720   1.0000
    tenuresq     0.2859   0.3071   0.3231   0.9439   1.0000
      tenure     0.2576   0.2738   0.2850   1.0000
        age3     0.9675   0.9916   1.0000
       agesq     0.9920   1.0000
         AGE     1.0000
                                                                                                                                            
                    AGE    agesq     age3   tenure tenuresq  tenure3      roe      roa  riskret riskcorp      OWN      uct       u0     umin
 
Correlation matrix for economic and ownership attributes using spearman correlation 
coefficients 
. 
        umin    -0.1693  -0.1693  -0.1693  -0.6544  -0.6544  -0.6544   0.0545  -0.0150   0.0822   0.0794  -0.2432   0.1570  -0.0837   1.0000 
          u0    -0.0114  -0.0114  -0.0114   0.4709   0.4709   0.4709   0.0088   0.0309  -0.0129  -0.0136  -0.0120  -0.0107   1.0000 
         uct    -0.1090  -0.1090  -0.1090  -0.1243  -0.1243  -0.1243   0.1231   0.0029   0.1650   0.1637  -0.2977   1.0000 
         OWN     0.2561   0.2561   0.2561   0.1622   0.1622   0.1622  -0.1602  -0.0638  -0.0885  -0.1072   1.0000 
    riskcorp    -0.0311  -0.0311  -0.0311  -0.0604  -0.0604  -0.0604   0.2061   0.1111   0.8848   1.0000 
     riskret    -0.0243  -0.0243  -0.0243  -0.0648  -0.0648  -0.0648   0.1205   0.0816   1.0000 
         roa     0.0027   0.0027   0.0027   0.0313   0.0313   0.0313   0.6161   1.0000 
         roe    -0.0154  -0.0154  -0.0154  -0.0391  -0.0391  -0.0391   1.0000 
     tenure3     0.1268   0.1268   0.1268   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000 
    tenuresq     0.1268   0.1268   0.1268   1.0000   1.0000 
      tenure     0.1268   0.1268   0.1268   1.0000 
        age3     1.0000   1.0000   1.0000 
       agesq     1.0000   1.0000 
         AGE     1.0000 
                                                                                                                                            
                    AGE    agesq     age3   tenure tenuresq  tenure3      roe      roa  riskret riskcorp      OWN      uct       u0     umin
(obs=4879)
. spearman ( AGE agesq age3 tenure tenuresq tenure3 roe roa riskret riskcorp OWN uct u0 umin)
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ANNEX B 
Table 4. Regressions of top executive compensation on firm’s economic and ownership 
attributes 
 SALFIX SALCASH OPTIONS STOCKS SALTOT 
Age +2.56  (0.48) +3.001 (0.45) -63.7 (-1.52) -30.2 (-2.1) -14.9(-1.66) 
Age2 -0.000  (-0.03) -0.000 (-0.18) +1.23 (1.63) 0.6 (2.51) 0.2(1.9) 
Age3 -1.01e-04 (-0.2) 6.6e-05 (0.1) -0.000 (-1.60) -0.000 (-2.74) -0.000 (-1.93) 
Tenure -11.4 (-8.41) -10.9 (-7.21) -49 (-5.91) -19 (-5.65) -17(-6.51) 
Tenure2 +0. 40 (7.44) +0.04 (6.85) +1.8 (4.76) 0.6 (4.64) 0.6 (6.11) 
Tenure3 -0.000 (-6.12) -0.0004(-5.95) -0.000 (-3.8) -0.000 (-3.34) -0.000 (-5.5) 
ROA -0.018 (-0.49) 0.0258 (0.57) -0.059 (-0.46) +0.132 (0.72) 0.072 (-0.53) 
ROE -0.006**(-2.9) -0.0107** (-3.5) -0.012 (-0.53) -0.014**(-1.99) -0.0176* (0.81) 
riskRET -4.52(-0.49) -0.0409 (-0.00) -60.23 (-1.37) -51.5 (-1.36) -14.3 (-0.74) 
riskCORP +0.361(1.73) +0.041** (2.08) +2.79** (3.3) +1.2** (2.45) 0.012**(2.12) 
OWN -0.36 (-0.8) -0.28(-0.57) +4.8 (1.54) 4.39** (3.59) 0.4  (-0.53) 
Uct -2.64** (-3.74) -2.29**(-2.76) -24.69**(-3.3) -12.73** (-3.9) -5.26* (-1.91) 
U0 +8.83** (5.60) +6.81** (3.51) 26.02**(2.13) 17.29** (3.56) 11.16** (2.91) 
Umin -40.11** (-6.1) -38.41** (-5.32) -110.7**(-3.5) -59.7** (-4.09) -55.39** (-4.77) 
trend +0.0039 -0.14 1.05 0.68 0.14 (0.65) 
Trend2 +0.002 +0.009 -0.06 -0.031 -0.009 (-0.72) 
**Significant at 5% level  
*Significant at 10% level  
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Graph 1. Distribution of logarithm (lnsalfix) of fixed salary over studied period 
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Graph 2.  Distribution of cash salary (lnsalcash) over studied period 
 
Graph 3. Distribution of stock options (lnSTOCKA) component over studied period  
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Graph 4. Distribution of total compensation (lnsaltot) component over studied period  
 
